Professor Sir Joseph Rotblat was one of the most distinguished scientists and peace campaigners of the post second world war period. He made significant contributions to nuclear physics and worked on the development of the atomic bomb. He then became one of the world’s leading researchers into the biological effects of radiation. His life from the early 1950s until his death in August 2005 was devoted to the abolition of nuclear weapons and peace. For this he was awarded the Nobel (...) Peace Prize, together with Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (that he helped found) in 1995. His work in this area ranked with that of Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell and this article is an attempt to summarise his life, achievements, but in particular outline his views on the moral responsibilities of the scientist. He is a towering intellectual figure and his contributions to mankind should be better known and more widely understood. (shrink)

‘Game’ means ‘play within the construction of rules’. The sub-category ‘sport’ considers play as competition where the rules are known to the audience, under the following divide: fundamental constructive rules about the game's structure and less important or flexible rules facilitating and monitoring play. These provide athletes and audience with stable knowledge. The excitement of play comes from the vagaries of the actual engagement of the rules in the action of play. The social order can use this as a metaphor (...) of its ideal of civil law in relation to the citizen. (shrink)

Mainstream game theory explains cooperation as the outcome of the interaction of agents who permanently pursue their individual goals. Amartya Sen argues instead that cooperation can only be understood by positing a type of rule-following behaviour that can be out of phase with the pursuit of individual goals, due to the existence of a collective identity. However, Sen does not clarify the ontological preconditions for the type of social behaviour he describes. I will argue that Sen's account of collective (...) identity can be best interpreted in the light of John Searle's notion of collective intentionality, while Sen's explanation of rule-following behavior and agency is best understood using the critical realist transformational model of social activity. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger was engaged in a continual struggle to find words - new words, both descriptive and analytical - for his radical form of philosophy. This tendency can be traced from Being and Time, where he elaborated an entirely new vocabulary for his ontological enquiry; to Contributions to Philosophy, which saw him committed to a transformation of language; to later essays on poets such as Rilke and Trakl in On the Way to Language. The Writing of Aletheia is the (...) first study to appear in either English or German that provides a full account of Heidegger's language and writing style. Focusing not only on his major philosophical works but also on his lectures, public talks and poetry, this book explores the complex textuality of Heidegger's writing: the elaborate chains of wordplay and neologistic formations; the often oblique, circuitous and regressive exposition of his ideas; the infamous tautologies; the startling modification of grammatical rules and syntax; the idiosyncratic typography of his texts; the rhetorical devices, imagery and symbolism; and the tone and voice of his writing. All of these aspects betray not only his will to structure and his assertiveness but also his ongoing self-questioning and reflectiveness about the ultimate goal of his philosophical quest. (shrink)

In March 1928, John Dewey responded to a request from Marie Meloney, editor of the New York Herald-Tribune Sunday Magazine, and offered his recommendations on recently published texts on education. Dewey wrote, "I think the best educational books of recent publication are Bode, Modern Educational Theories . . . Kilpatrick, Education for a Changing Civilization . . . & Martin, The Meaning of a Liberal Education".1 This was not the first time Dewey recommended Everett Dean Martin's book. In (...) 1927, the editors of the Journal of the National Education Association approached Dewey and asked, "What book have you recently found especially worthwhile? Something that you have read easily, eagerly, and with profit—either in .. (shrink)

A transformative decision rule transforms a given decision probleminto another by altering the structure of the initial problem,either by changing the framing or by modifying the probability orvalue assignments. Examples of decision rules belonging to thisclass are the principle of insufficient reason, Isaac Levi'scondition of E-admissibility, the de minimis rule, andthe precautionary principle. In this paper some foundationalissues concerning transformative decision rules are investigated,and a couple of formal properties of this class of rules areproved.

Over the last few years, a new methodology to address the P versus NP problem has been developed, based on searching for borderlines between the nonefficiency of computing models and the presumed efficiency. These borderlines can be seen as frontiers of efficiency, which are crucial in this methodology. “Translating,” in some sense, an efficient solution in a presumably efficient model to an efficient solution in a nonefficient model would give an affirmative answer to problem P versus NP. In the framework (...) of Membrane Computing, the key of this approach is to detect the syntactic or semantic ingredients that are needed to pass from a nonefficient class of membrane systems to a presumably efficient one. This paper deals with tissue P systems with communication rules of type symport/antiport allowing the evolution of the objects triggering the rules. In previous works, frontiers of efficiency were found in these kinds of membrane systems both with division rules and with separation rules. However, since they were not optimal, it is interesting to refine these frontiers. In this work, optimal frontiers of the efficiency are obtained in terms of the total number of objects involved in the communication rules used for that kind of membrane systems. These optimizations could be easier to translate, if possible, to efficient solutions in a nonefficient model. (shrink)

No other recent book in Anglophone philosophy has attracted as much criticism and has found so few friends as Saul Kripke's "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language". Amongst its critics, one finds the very top of the philosophical profession. Yet, it is rightly counted amongst the books that students of philosophy, at least in the Anglo-American world, have to read at some point in their education. Enormously influential, it has given rise to debates that strike at the very heart of (...) contemporary philosophy of mind and language. In this major new interpretation, Martin Kusch defends Kripke's account against the numerous weighty objections that have been put forward over the past twenty years and argues that none of them is decisive. He shows that many critiques are based on misunderstandings of Kripke's reasoning; that many attacks can be blocked by refining and developing Kripke's position; and that many alternative proposals turn out either to be unworkable or to be disguised variants of the view they are meant to replace. Kusch argues that the apparent simplicity of Kripke's text is deceptive and that a fresh reading gives Kripke's overall argument a new strength. (shrink)

A theory of rationality is a theory that evaluates instances of reasoning as rational, irrational, or (ir)rational to some degree. Theories can be categorized as rule-based or consequentialist. Rule-based theories say that rational reasoning accords with certain rules (e.g., of logic or probability). Consequentialist theories say that rational reasoning tends to produce good consequences. For instance, the reliabilist takes rationality to be reasoning that tends to produce mostly true beliefs. The pragmatist takes it to be reasoning that tends (...) to produce mostly useful beliefs. This article reviews some of the features and the challenges of rule-based, reliabilist, and pragmatist theories of rationality. (shrink)

Volume 18, Issue 3, October 2019, Page 261-262.

The underlying theme of this article is how a successor state should deal with its past. It considers whether a state that is committed to the rule of law may depart from it in order to deal with problems left to it by its predecessor regime. Specifically, may it use retroactive legislation to punish informers who collaborated with a predecessor police state? Lon Fuller's formulation of the canons of the rule of law as an internal morality of law (...) is expounded as well as his notion of legal pathology as symptomatic of departure from the canons' requirements. Various problems inherent to the implementation of the rule of law are examined, such as the effect of the passage of time on reasonable expectations. While legal pathology is always a matter of degree, police states are shown to suffer seriously from it. Among the examples discussed are Nazi Germany and Communist East Germany, though it is granted that there are moral differences between them. In the course of the discussion, a response is made to some contemporary critiques of the rule of law. Although it would be difficult to formulate a retroactive law for punishing informers, it is argued that such a law may be the best way for a successor state to express a moral judgment on its past. Diesem Artikel liegt die Frage zugrunde, in welcher Weise ein Nachfolge-Staat mit seiner Vergangenheit umgehen sollte. Es wird untersucht, ob ein Staat, der sich der Idee des Rechtsstaats verpflichtet fühlt, von dieser Idee abrücken darf, um mit den Problemen umzugehen, die ihm von seinem Vorgänger-Staat hinterlassen worden sind. Insbesondere wird gefragt, ob ein solcher Staat zu dem Mittel rückwirkender Gesetzgebung greifen darf, um Denunzianten zu bestrafen, die mit einem vorangehenden Polizeistaat kollaboriert haben. Lon Fullers Formulierung der Prinzipien eines Rechtsstaats im Sinne einer internen Moralität des Rechts wird ebenso erläutert wie sein Begriff von rechtlicher Pathologie als Symptom für ein Abgehen von den Anforderungen der genannten Prinzipien. Verschiedene Schwierigkeiten, die mit der Verwirklichung des Rechtsstaats entstehen, werden näher untersucht, so etwa die Auswirkungen des Zeitablaufs hinsichtlich vernünftiger Erwartungen . Wenngleich rechtliche Pathologie immer eine Frage des Grades ist, kann doch gezeigt werden, daß Polizeistaaten ernstlich an ihr leiden. Unter den diskutierten Beispielen sind Nazi-Deutschland und das kommunistische Ostdeutschland, obwohl zugegeben werden muß, daß es zwischen diesen moralische Unterschiede gibt. Im Verlauf der Untersuchung wird zudem auf einige gegenwärtige kritische Stellungnahmen zum Rechtsstaat erwidert. Obwohl es schwierig wäre, ein rückwirkendes Gesetz zur Bestrafung von Denunzianten zu formulieren, wird doch die These vertreten, daß ein derartiges Gesetz der beste Weg für einen Nachfolge-Staat sein könnte, ein moralisches Urteil über seine Vergangenheit zum Ausdruck zu bringen. (shrink)

In a recent article entitled “Tensed Sentences and Free Repeatability” (The Philosophical Review,” 1973), Stephen E. Braude puts forward the following argument: (a) Nonsimultaneous replicas of tensed sentences have the same sense; (b) therefore, tensed sentences are not translatable into tenseless sentences. I point out that the plausibility of (a) depends on which theory of meaning is true. If the rules of use theory of meaning is true, then (a) is true, but if either the content or reference theory of (...) meaning is true, (a) is questionable. I also point out that some philosophers, such as Nelson Goodman and W. V. O. Quine, who deny (b) in order to make philosophical claims about the status of temporal becoming and perspicuous languages, do not state whether the equivalence of tensed and tenseless sentences is an equivalence of rules of use, content, or reference. Braude has shown that a rules of use version of (b) is true, but not that a content or reference version of (b) is true. (shrink)

Can one teach democracy? This question came repeatedly to my mind as I read Jan-Werner Müller's stimulating contribution to the recent literature on the past history, current travails, and future p...

Il saggio intende recuperare un’idea di utopia realistica e priva di illusioni come nucleo propulsivo del pensiero politico. Questo tipo di utopia si distingue sia dall’immaginazione fantastica di stati di cose non realizzabili, sia dall’avvicinamento asintotico a qualcosa che in realtà non corrisponde ai desideri umani, com’è per l’idea regolativa di Kant. Tre condizioni rendono realistiche e sensate le utopie politiche: il poter essere pensato, il poter essere soddisfatto e il poter essere conseguito. L’idea di Rawls di una pace tra (...) i popoli, o quella di Margalit su istituzioni rispettose dell’individuo sono esempi di queste utopie realistiche. Richiamando possibilità remote, esse rendono visibili nuove possibilità per il presente, che possono poi venire tradotte in istanze normative di tipo politico-sociale. Ciò vale anche per le utopie private, che allargano le possibilità per l’esistenza. Rinunciare a queste nuove possibilità comporta un doppio tradimento di noi stessi, su scala collettiva e sul piano personale.The paper propose to rehabilitate an idea of realistic and undeceived utopy as propulsive centre of politic thought. This kind of utopy is different from fantastic immaginating of unrealizable state of things, and asyntotic approssimating to something that does’nt really correspond to human desires, as it is for Kant’s regulative idea. There are three conditions for making utopias realistic and senseful: the possibility of being thought, fulfilled and reached. Rawls’ idea of peoples’ peaceful living, or Margalit’s idea of institutions’ respect of individuums, are examples of this kind of realistic utopias. Through recalling far possibilities they let appear new possibilities for the present, that can be traducted in political-social normative instances. And this method applies for private utopias, too. To renounce those new possibilities means a double traison of ourselves, in a collective and personal sense. (shrink)

A transformative decision rule alters the representation of a decision problem, either by changing the set of alternative acts or the set of states of the world taken into consideration, or by modifying the probability or value assignments. A set of transformative decision rules is order-independent in case the order in which the rules are applied is irrelevant. The main result of this paper is an axiomatic characterization of order-independent transformative decision rules, based on a single axiom. It is (...) shown that the proposed axiomatization resolves a problem observed by Teddy Seidenfeld in a previous axiomatization by Peterson. (shrink)

The concept of transformative decision rules provides auseful tool for analyzing what is often referred to as the`framing', or `problem specification', or `editing' phase ofdecision making. In the present study we analyze a fundamentalaspect of transformative decision rules, viz. permutability. A setof transformative decision rules is, roughly put, permutable justin case it does not matter in which order the rules are applied.It is argued that in order to be normatively reasonable, sets oftransformative decision rules have to satisfy a number ofstructural (...) conditions that together imply permutability. Thisformal result gives support to a non-sequential theory of framing,i.e., a theory which prescribes no uniform order in which differentsteps in the framing process have to be performed. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Discussion The Chinese Room Experiment (cruel version).

This paper examines theories of first person authority proposed by Dorit Bar-On (2004), Crispin Wright (1989a) and Sydney Shoemaker (1988). What all three accounts have in common is that they attempt to explain first person authority by reference to the way our language works. Bar-On claims that in our language self-ascriptions of mental states are regarded as expressive of those states; Wright says that in our language such self-ascriptions are treated as true by default; and Shoemaker suggests that they might (...) arise from our capacity to avoid Moore-paradoxical utterances. I argue that Bar-On’s expressivism and Wright’s constitutive theory suffer from a similar problem: They fail to explain how it is possible for us to instantiate the language structures that supposedly bring about first person authority. Shoemaker’s account does not suffer from this problem. But it is unclear whether the capacity to avoid Moore-paradoxical utterances really yields self-knowledge. Also, it might be that self-knowledge explains why we have this capacity rather than vice versa. (shrink)

Moses Mendelssohn was the leading Jewish thinker of the German Enlightenment and the founder of modern Jewish philosophy. His writings, especially his attempt during the Pantheism Controversy to defend the philosophical legacies of Spinoza and Leibniz against F. H. Jacobi’s philosophy of faith, captured the attention of a young Leo Strauss and played a critical role in the development of his thought on one of the fundamental themes of his life’s work: the conflicting demands of reason and revelation. _ Leo (...) Strauss on Moses Mendelssohn_ is a superbly annotated translation of ten introductions written by Strauss to a multi-volume critical edition of Mendelssohn’s work. Commissioned in Weimar Germany in the 1920s, the project was suppressed and nearly destroyed during Nazi rule and was not revived until the 1960s. In addition to Strauss’s introductions, Martin D. Yaffe has translated Strauss’s editorial remarks on each of the passages he annotates in Mendelssohn’s texts and brings those together with the introductions themselves. Yaffe has also contributed an extensive interpretive essay that both analyzes the introductions on their own terms and discusses what Strauss writes elsewhere about the broader themes broached in his Mendelssohn studies. Strauss’s critique of Mendelssohn represents one of the largest bodies of work by the young Strauss on a single thinker to be made available in English. It illuminates not only a formerly obscure phase in the emergence of his thought but also a critical moment in the history of the German Enlightenment. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Tacitus, Annales VI: Beginning and EndClifford AndoOur sole witness for the text of Annales I–VI, the so-called Mediceus, 1 duly registers the ends of books 1 through 4, but of no book thereafter. The question of where to locate the beginning of book 6 has not been discussed at any length since 1848, and that we have the end of book 6 at our 6.51 has not, to my (...) knowledge, ever been disputed. The answer we posit to both questions has, obviously, profound implications for modern attempts to interpret the structure of the Annales. This note urges on the former issue a return to the division after 5.11 first established by Lipsius, and on the latter proposes the radical solution that we do not possess the end of book 6.Though Emilio Ferretti (1541, ad loc.) was the first to perceive the difficulty in the text of books 5 and 6 as preserved by M, Lipsius took the necessary step of establishing a break between the books, at 5.11: his book 6 begins at the start of A.D. 32. Though he perceived that a two-year gap separates 5.5 and 5.6, he settled on 6.1 not for any solid reason, but on purely arbitrary grounds (1585, 265). Lipsius did, however, attempt to anticipate one counterattack: some will argue that his division leaves book 5 too short, since it will contain the events of only three years, 29–31 A.D. (ibid.). In 1848 Friedrich Haase attacked the position taken by Lipsius on several fronts: first, Lipsius’ division leaves book 6 disproportionately short, and nothing can be missing from the end of this book because it cannot be doubted that Tacitus began book 7 with the accession of Gaius. Second, even if it were not self-evident that the death of the emperor was more important than the end of a year, this would follow naturally upon the observation that Tacitus closes book 12 in October, after the death of Claudius, although in order to complete that year he would only have had to move the first ten chapters of book 13. Third, there is no way that the scribe could have overlooked or forgotten a colophon between 5.11 and 6.1 because M records them in such large letters. Finally, Tacitus would have regarded the death of Seianus, [End Page 285] the aftermath of which is covered in 5.6–11, as eminently suitable for the end of a book, as he closed book 9 with the death of Messalina, or book 15 with the suppression of the Pisonian conspiracy. Haase also anticipated, and dismissed, the charge that, on his reconstruction, book 5 will be too short, since it will cover even less than the three years assumed by Lipsius (1848, 152–53).Subsequent scholars, to the extent that any have commented on this issue, have followed Haase as resolutely as earlier editors followed Lipsius. 2 Variations on Haase’s argument have been offered by Nipperdey 1879, who suggested that the downfall of Seianus was so dramatic that readers needed a respite in the form of a book-break before resuming with the prosecution of his adherents (ad 5.5); and by Ronald Martin, who argued that “in spite of the loss of most of Book 5 and (probably) the beginning of Book 6 it seems clear that, as Germanicus dies towards the end of Book 2, with the aftermath of his death flowing over into the opening chapters of Book 3, so Seianus’ death occurred at or near the end of Book 5, while the aftermath of his death flows over into the early chapters of Book 6” (1991, 1518 n. 55).We can first dispose of any concerns about the length of either book. There were relatively few constraints upon the size of a papyrus roll: one could be as long or short as desired. A roll’s apparent length would also depend in large measure on the hand in which it was written, and how tightly it was rolled. For obvious reasons, long books were far more unwieldy than short ones, not least because it... (shrink)

"Exemplary Originality": Kant on Genius and Imitation MARTIN GAMMON 1. INTRODUCTION ACCORDING TO ERNST CASSIRER, Kant 's discussion of genius in the Third Cri- tique stands "at the crossroads of all aesthetic discussions in the eighteenth century," in that he tries to accommodate the neo-Classical demand that art- works follow determinate rules to the Romantic insistence that aesthetic cre- ativity be free from such rules? In the Third Critique itself, Kant defends both of these criteria through the doctrine of (...) "exemplary originality." For Kant, the genius combines two qualities: on the one hand, "a talent for produc- ing that for which no rule can be given," so that "originality must be its primary property"; however, "since there may also be original nonsense, its products must at the same time be models, i.e., be exemplary; and consequently, though not themselves derived from imitation, they must serve that purpose for oth- ers, i.e., as a standard or rule for estimating."' On the basis of this exemplary originality, then, a genius puts "freedom from constraint of rules so into force in his art, that for art itself a new rule is won -- which is what shows a talent to be exemplary". Recently, some commentators have puzzled over the "air of paradox" sur- rounding Kant 's union of originality and exemplarity in works of genius. "If such works," Timothy Gould conjectures, "make advances on what is familiar and gain new ground, their very. (shrink)

My intention is to cast light on the characteristics of epistemic or fundamental research (in contrast to application-oriented research). I contrast a Baconian notion of objectivity, expressing a correspondence of the views of scientists to the facts, with a pluralist notion, involving a critical debate between conflicting approaches. These conflicts include substantive hypotheses or theories but extend to values as well. I claim that a plurality of epistemic values serves to accomplish a non-Baconian form of objectivity that is apt to (...) preserve most of the intuitions tied to the objectivity of science. For instance, pluralism is the only way to cope with the challenge of preference bias. Furthermore, the plurality of epistemic values cannot be substantially reduced by exploring the empirical success of scientific theories distinguished in light of particular such values. However, in addition to pluralism at the level of theories and value-commitments alike, scientific research is also characterized by a joint striving for consensus which I trace back to a shared epistemic attitude. This attitude manifests itself, e.g., in the willingness of scientists to subject their claims to empirical scrutiny and to respect rational argument. This shared epistemic attitude is embodied in rules adopted by the scientific community concerning general principles of dealing with knowledge claims. My contention is that pluralism and consensus formation can be brought into harmony by placing them at different levels of consideration: at the level of scientific reasoning and at the level of social conventions regarding how to deal with claims put forward within the scientific community. (shrink)

According to a given quota q\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$q$$\end{document}, a candidate a\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$a$$\end{document} is beaten by another candidate b\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$b$$\end{document} if at least a proportion of q\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$q$$\end{document} individuals prefer b\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$b$$\end{document} to a\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$a$$\end{document}. (...) The q\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$q$$\end{document}-majority efficiency of a voting rule is the probability that the rule selects a candidate who is never beaten under the q\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$q$$\end{document}-majority, given that such a candidate exits. Closed form representations are obtained for the q\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$q$$\end{document}-majority efficiency of positional rules in three-candidate elections. It turns out that the q\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$q$$\end{document}-majority efficiency is: significantly greater for sequential rules than for simple positional rules; and very close to the q\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$q$$\end{document}-Condorcet efficiency, the conditional probability that a positional rule will elect the candidate who beats all others under the q\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$q$$\end{document}-majority, when one exists. (shrink)

John Corcoran’s natural deduction system for Aristotle’s syllogistic is reconsidered.Though Corcoran is no doubt right in interpreting Aristotle as viewing syllogisms as arguments and in rejecting Lukasiewicz’s treatment in terms of conditional sentences, it is argued that Corcoran is wrong in thinking that the only alternative is to construe Barbara and Celarent as deduction rules in a natural deduction system.An alternative is presented that is technically more elegant and equally compatible with the texts.The abstract role assigned by tradition and Lukasiewicz (...) to Barbara and Celarent is retained.The two ‘ perfect syllogisms’ serve as ‘basic elements’ in the construction of an inductively defined set of valid syllogisms.The proposal departs from Lukasiewicz, and follows Corcoran, however, in construing the construction as one in natural deduction.The result is a sequent system with fewer rules and in which Barbara and Celarent serve as basic deductions.To compare the theory to Corcoran’s, his original is reformulated in current terms and generalized.It is shown to be equivalent to the proposed sequent system, and several variations are discussed.For all systems mentioned, a method of Henkin‐style completeness proofs is given that is more direct and intuitive than Corcoran’s original. (shrink)

This paper seeks to establish a connection between the existence of a legal system and the ideal of the rule of law. Its point of departure is the phenomenon of a transitional regime that is attempting to restore or institute the rule of law. Lon Fuller's formulation of the canons of the rule of law as an internal morality of law is expounded as well as his notion of legal pathology as symptomatic of departure from the canons' (...) requirements. The existence of a legal system, it is argued, is a matter of degree, covariant with the degree to which the rule of law is realized. Problems inherent to the implementation of the rule of law are examined, such as the effect of the passage of time on reasonable expectations. While legal pathology is always a matter of degree, police states are shown to suffer seriously from it. Among the examples discussed are Nazi Germany and Communist East Germany, though it is granted that there are moral differences between them. Finally, a response is made to some contemporary critiques of the rule of law. (shrink)

I argue that assertion and practical reasoning must be governed by the same epistemic norm. This is because the epistemic rule governing assertion derives from the epistemic rule governing practical reasoning, together with a plausible rule regarding assertion, according to which assertion must manifest belief.

International courts are an integral component of the international legal system. These courts have been proliferating over time and increasingly working to ensure state compliance with the rules of the international regulatory regimes they join. However, these courts face a fundamental challenge: while they can rule against governments in violation of the regime’s rules, they cannot enforce those decisions. Working from the first principle that the regulatory regime is designed to help resolve collective action problems among the signees, this (...) Article proposes a formal model of international court influence that helps to explain the extent and limits of international court influence on national government behavior. (shrink)